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IMPORTANCE A higher out-of-pocket price for mental health care may lead not only to cost
savings but also to negative downstream consequences.
OBJECTIVE To examine the association of higher patient cost sharing with mental health care
use and downstream effects, such as involuntary commitment and acute mental health care
use.
DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS This difference-in-differences study compared changes
in mental health care use by adults, who experienced an increase in cost sharing, with
changes in youths, who did not experience the increase and thus formed a control group. The
study examined all 2 780 558 treatment records opened from January 1, 2010, through
December 31, 2012, by 110 organizations that provide specialist mental health care in the
Netherlands. Data analysis was performed from January 18, 2016, to May 9, 2017.
EXPOSURES On January 1, 2012, the Dutch national government increased the out-of-pocket
price of mental health services for adults by up to €200 (US$226) per year for outpatient
treatment and €150 (US$169) per month for inpatient treatment.
MAIN OUTCOMES ANDMEASURES The number of treatment records opened each day in
regular specialist mental health care, involuntary commitment, and acute mental health care,
and annual specialist mental health care spending.
RESULTS This study included 1 448 541 treatment records opened from 2010 to 2012 (mean
[SD] age, 41.4 [16.7] years; 712 999men and 735 542 women). The number of regular mental
health care records opened for adults decreased abruptly and persistently by 13.4% (95% CI,
−16.0% to −10.8%; P < .001) per day when cost sharing was increased in 2012. The decrease
was substantial and significant for severe andmild disorders and larger in low-income than in
high-income neighborhoods. Simultaneously, in 2012, daily record openings increased for
involuntary commitment by 96.8% (95% CI, 87.7%-105.9%; P < .001) and for acute mental
health care by 25.1% (95% CI, 20.8%-29.4%; P < .001). In contrast to our findings for adults,
the use of regular care among youths increased slightly and the use of involuntary
commitment and acute care decreased slightly after the reform. Overall, the cost-sharing
reformwas associated with estimated savings of €13.4 million (US$15.1 million). However, for
adults with psychotic disorder or bipolar disorder, the additional costs of involuntary
commitment and acute mental health care exceeded savings by €25.5 million (US$28.8
million).
CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE Higher cost sharing for seriously ill and low-income patients
could discourage treatment of vulnerable populations and create substantial downstream
costs.
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P atient cost sharing lowers health care spending be-cause individuals tend to use fewer health serviceswhen theyare required topayaportionof thecost com-
pared with full insurance.1,2 It has been argued in the health
insurance literature that, if demand for certain health ser-
vices is highly responsive toprice changes, patients donotde-
rivehighvalue fromthose services.3,4Because thedemand for
mental health services is highly responsive to price changes,
some researchers have argued that there is an efficiency ra-
tionale for higher cost sharing for mental health care.5
However, empiricalwork suggests that patients subject to
cost sharing reduce their use of not only low-value but also
high-valuecare.6,7Forcertain illnesses,highercost sharingmay
lead to undesirable consequences, potentially with down-
stream costs thatmore than offset the policy’s savings.8,9 For
the patient, these broadly defined costs could include worse
health fromforgonetreatmentandthedisutilityofusingdown-
stream services relative to regular services. For society, these
costs could include the greater expense of providing down-
streamservices topatients inworsehealth.The literature raises
several questions. Does the negative association between
highercost sharingandtheuseofmentalhealthcarevarybased
on observable patient characteristics? Is the reduced use of
mental health care associated with an increase in down-
stream costs to the patient or society? If so, should cost shar-
ing for certain patients be lower than for others?
We investigated these questions using a quasi-
experimental study design in the Netherlands, where
mandatory cost sharing for specialist mental health (includ-
ing substance use) services was increased and a unique data
set of treatment records for 87% of all specialist mental
health patients from 2010 to 2012 was available. Our study
assessed whether, after the reform, fewer adult patients
received outpatient or inpatient treatment by income and
major diagnosis category, including the seriously ill, who
may benefit greatly from treatment.10 Because youths did
not face the cost-sharing reform, they formed a natural
unaffected control group to examine the influence of the
cost-sharing reform on adult use of mental health services.
Next, we investigated whether the reform was associated
with greater involuntary commitment or acute mental
health care use among adults and whether the resulting
costs were outweighed by the savings from reduced regular
care for each of the major diagnosis categories.
Methods
Setting
The Netherlands has a long history of universal health insur-
ance with comprehensive coverage,11 low out-of-pocket
expenditures,12 and premium subsidies for low-income indi-
viduals. Before 2012, the single health care–wide annual de-
ductible,which applied to total costs summedacross all types
of specialisthealthcare,hadnotbeenmore than€170(US$192).
However, to combat increasing mental health care costs, the
Dutchnational government increased theout-of-pocket price
for outpatient and inpatient specialist mental health care ef-
fective January 1, 2012.Foroutpatient care, adultpatientswere
required to pay €100 (US$113) out of pocket to open a treat-
ment record and an additional €100 (US$113) if they received
a total of more than 100 minutes of care during that treat-
ment record. For inpatient care, adult patients were required
to pay a monthly co-pay of €150 (US$169). We therefore ex-
aminedwhetherahigherout-of-pocketprice formentalhealth
care led to savings and negative downstream consequences.
The datawere deidentified beforewe obtained them, and the
project was determined not human subjects research byHar-
vard's institutional reviewboard. For these reasons, ethics ap-
proval was not required for this study.
Amental health treatment recordworked as follows. The
physicianopeneda treatment recordwhen thepatient started
treatment, and a single treatment record covered all of thepa-
tient’s care forup to365days after thedate that the recordwas
opened. However, all treatment records automatically closed
after 365 days; to continue treatment, a patient then had to
openanew treatment record. Consequently, patientswere af-
fectedbythepostreformout-of-pocketprices if andonly if their
treatment record was opened in 2012.
The reform applied to all adults irrespective of their in-
come but did not apply to youths (those 17 years or younger
onthedatewhenatreatment recordwasopened),didnotaffect
theout-of-pocketprice formedicationorprimarycare, anddid
not apply to involuntary commitment or acutemental health
care. Involuntary commitment occurredwhen a civil court of
justice committed unwilling patients who presented a threat
to themselves or others in accordance with the Law on Spe-
cial Admissions in Psychiatric Hospitals. Acutemental health
care, which was on a voluntary basis and could last no more
than 28 days, was care offered only to individuals who re-
quired immediate treatment because they posed a threat to
themselves or caused a public nuisance.13 Because the com-
mitmentprocedurewas involuntary andacute care couldonly
last a short duration, involuntary commitment andacute care
were unlikely to be substitutes for individualswhowanted to
circumvent thepostreform increase in theout-of-pocketprice
of regular care. See eMethods in the Supplement for addi-
tional institutional details.
Key Points
Questions Does higher patient cost sharing for mental health care
reduce use and, if so, increase downstream costs to the patient or
society?
Findings This study of 1 448 541 treatment records in the
Netherlands found that a national reform that increased cost
sharing led to reduced use of mental health care for severe and
mild disorders, especially in low-income neighborhoods. Overall,
this reduced use created net savings, but for patients with
psychotic disorder or bipolar disorder, the reformwas associated
with costly increases in involuntary commitment and acute mental
health care.
Meaning Higher cost sharing for seriously ill patients could create
substantial downstream costs.
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Measure of Use and Data Source
The cost-sharing reformprimarily affected an individual’s de-
cision to open a treatment record as opposed to how much
treatment to seek during a treatment record. Therefore, we
measuredmental health care use by the number of treatment
records that were opened each day. Our data consisted of all
individual-level, administrativemental health treatment rec-
ords from all 110member organizations of the Dutch associa-
tion formental health service providers (GGZ-NL) from Janu-
ary 1, 2010, through December 31, 2012. Data analysis was
performed fromJanuary 18, 2016, toMay9, 2017.Members of
GGZ-NL treated 87% of all specialist mental health records in
the Netherlands during the observation period. The remain-
ing 13% of records had a relatively low degree of complexity
and were treated by small organizations. For each treatment
record,weobservedthe following:patient sexandyearofbirth,
the start and end date of the record, the type of treatment,
whether thepatient receivedanyacutementalhealthcaredur-
ing the record, oneDSM-IV–basedprimarydiagnosis code, the
number of inpatient and outpatient treatment minutes, and
the 4-digit postal code of the patient’s residence.
Study Population
Weseparated adults, thosewho turned 19years or older in the
year that they opened a treatment record and were thus af-
fectedbythereform, fromyouths, thosewhoturned15 through
17 years old and thus formed a control group that was unaf-
fectedby the reform.Weobservedyearof birth rather than the
exact date of birth; thus, wemeasured a patient’s age by sub-
tracting the patient’s birth year from the year when the pa-
tient’s treatment recordwas opened.We couldnot determine
whether individuals aged 18 years according to our measure
were in fact 18 years of age (ie, affected by the reform if they
started treatment in 2012) or 17 years of age (ie, youths unaf-
fected by the reform) on the date when their treatment rec-
ordwasopened.For this reason,weexcluded individuals aged
18 years from the analysis (eMethods in the Supplement).We
alsoexcluded thosewhomwemeasuredas 14yearsoryounger
to make our youth sample more comparable to the adult
sample. For adults and youths, we created 3 mutually exclu-
sive samples: a regular treatment sample, a sample with the
involuntary commitment records, anda samplewith theacute
treatment records (eMethods in the Supplement).
Table 1. Characteristics of the Regular Treatment Sample and Sizes for the Involuntary Commitment
and Acute Care Samplesa
Characteristic
No. (%) of Treatment Records
2010 2011 2012
Total No. of regular treatment records 435 290 452 165 393 667
Sex
Male 210 507 (48.4) 216 193 (47.8) 191 729 (48.7)
Female 224 783 (51.6) 235 972 (52.2) 201 938 (51.3)
Age group, y
19-24 52 397 (12.0) 53 944 (11.9) 47 587 (12.1)
25-34 92 382 (21.2) 96 073 (21.2) 83 401 (21.2)
35-44 101 517 (23.3) 103 419 (22.9) 88 908 (22.6)
45-54 93 454 (21.5) 97 790 (21.6) 84 663 (21.5)
55-64 52 690 (12.1) 55 266 (12.2) 48 731 (12.4)
≥65 42 850 (9.8) 45 673 (10.1) 40 377 (10.3)
Diagnosis
Depressive disorder 83 770 (19.2) 89 853 (19.9) 77 729 (19.7)
Substance-related disorder 61 737 (14.2) 58 857 (13.0) 52 625 (13.4)
Anxiety disorder 56 598 (13.0) 60 151 (13.3) 52 484 (13.3)
Psychotic disorder 51 218 (11.8) 54 122 (12.0) 49 139 (12.5)
Personality disorder 51 103 (11.7) 55 934 (12.4) 52 025 (13.2)
Missing 45 841 (10.5) 39 460 (8.7) 26 110 (6.6)
Disorder first diagnosed in childhood 32 646 (7.5) 38 638 (8.5) 34 582 (8.8)
Miscellaneous disorder 31 062 (7.1) 32 019 (7.1) 27 093 (6.9)
Bipolar disorder 21 315 (4.9) 23 131 (5.1) 21 880 (5.6)
Total time of treatment record, min
≤500 163 649 (37.6) 157 223 (34.8) 113 384 (28.8)
501-1500 137 363 (31.6) 146 549 (32.4) 131 282 (33.3)
1501-2500 56 067 (12.9) 63 255 (14.0) 61 905 (15.7)
>2500 78 211 (18.0) 85 138 (18.8) 87 096 (22.1)
Other treatment records
Involuntary commitment 921 1092 2156
Acute treatment 20 041 19 922 24 988 a All samples contain only adults.
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From the recorded primary diagnosis, we classified each
treatmentrecordinto1of9majordiagnosiscategories(eMethods
andeTable 1 in the Supplement). This classification allowedus
tocompareour results fordisorders thatareconsideredtobeon
averagemoresevere,suchaspsychoticdisorder,personalitydis-
order, or bipolar disorder,with those considered to be on aver-
age less severe, suchasanxietydisorderordepressivedisorder.
Toassigneachpatient toan incomedecile,we linked thepostal
code of a patient’s residence to themeanhousehold income in
2012 for that postal code14 and the number of inhabitants in
2011 for thatpostalcode15 (eMethods intheSupplement).Tocal-
culate costs for each record, we used the national tariff
schedule formental health insurance claims16 and an estimate
for the additional procedural costs per record for involuntary
commitment17 (eMethods in the Supplement).
Statistical Analysis
We used ordinary least squares regression models to esti-
mate the association of the cost-sharing reform with mental
health careuse, involuntary commitment, andacute care. For
each sample, our units of observationwere the calendar days
fromJanuary 1, 2010, throughDecember 31, 2012. Thedepen-
dentvariablewas thenumberof treatment recordsopenedthat
day as a fraction of the mean number of treatment records
opened per day in 2011. The independent variable of interest
was an indicator for openings in 2012, and its coefficientmea-
sured the percentage change in daily openings between 2011
and 2012. This model controlled for openings in 2010, day of
the week, and day of the year (eMethods in the Supplement).
To investigatewhether factors other than the reformwere re-
sponsible for changes in use, we estimated a difference-in-
differencesmodel on the pooled sample of regular treatment
records opened for adults and youths.18 This model con-
tained interactions between all covariates from the baseline
model and an indicator variable for being in the adult rather
than the youth sample (eMethods in the Supplement).
Forour figures,weobtainedresiduals fromregressions that
controlled for day of the week, day of the year, and holidays
to separate structural changes from seasonal patterns. After
adding themeandaily openings in 2011 to these residuals,we
plotted thesemean-shifted residuals to showdetrendeddaily
openings across the3years (eMethods in theSupplement).We
calculated P values using a 2-sided t test. Because we tested
multiple hypotheses, P < .002 was considered to be statisti-
Figure 1. Daily Openings of Treatment Records by Sample, 2010-2012
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cally significantat the5%level.Analyseswereperformedusing
R software, version 3.3.1 (R Foundation).
Results
Characteristics of Treatment Records
This study included 1 448541 treatment records of adults and
youths opened from 2010 to 2012 (mean [SD] age, 41.4 [16.7]
years; 712 999men and 735 542women).Table 1 provides the
annual number of treatment records opened for the adult
sample in regular care and a comparison of those records by
observed characteristics (additional discussion of these char-
acteristics is available in eResults in the Supplement). The raw
growth rate of 3.9% from2010 to 2011was consistentwith the
mean annual growth rate of 5.6% in treatment between 2004
and2010.19,20Bycontrast, the rawdecreaseof 14.8%from2011
to 2012 departed significantly from the prior annual trends
(eFigure in the Supplement).
In addition, Table 1 provides the total annual number of
treatment records opened for involuntary civil commitment
andforacutecare in theadult sample.Of thepatientswhowere
committed involuntarily, 63.7% were diagnosed with psy-
chotic disorder and 12.6% with bipolar disorder. The median
duration of an acute treatment record was 5 days (interquar-
tile range,2-17days), and64.2%ofpatientswhoreceivedacute
care had treatment records with a missing primary diagnosis
(providers were not required to report a diagnosis on treat-
ment records for acute care).
Incontrast toour findings foradults, theuseof regular care
among youths increased slightly and the use of involuntary
commitment and acute care decreased slightly after the re-
form (eTable 2 in the Supplement).
Use and Downstream Effects
Conditionaloncovariates, thenumberofdailyopeningsof regu-
lar treatment records among adults decreased persistently by
13.4%(95%CI,−16.0%to−10.8%;P < .001)whenthecost-sharing
reformwasintroducedonJanuary1,2012(Figure1A,Table2,and
eTable 3 in the Supplement). In contrast, the number of daily
openingsof regular treatmentrecords inthecontrolgroupofun-
affected youths increased slightly (Figure 1B and eTable 4 and
eTable5intheSupplement).Ourdifference-in-differencesmodel,
whichincludedadultsandyouths,yieldedanestimateof−15.4%
(95%CI,−18.5%to−12.3%;P < .001).This findingofreduceduse
remainedsignificantwhenweaccountedfor thepossibility that
individuals may have anticipated the reform (eResults in the
Supplement).
The number of daily records opened for adults increased
by 96.8% (95% CI, 87.7%-105.9%; P < .001) for involuntary
Table 2. Mental Health Care Use, Downstream Effects, and Heterogeneity Among Adultsa
Variable Daily Openings in 2011, Mean (SD)
Change Between 2011 and
2012 (95% CI), %b P Value
Type of care
Regular 1238.8 (588.3) −13.4 (−16.0 to −10.8) <.001
Commitment 3.0 (2.5) 96.8 (87.7 to 105.9) <.001
Acute 54.6 (15.0) 25.1 (20.8 to 29.4) <.001
Regular treatment by
income decile
1st 216.8 (94.0) −16.3 (−19.0 to −13.5) <.001
2nd 183.2 (87.3) −14.7 (−17.5 to −11.9) <.001
3rd 149.7 (70.7) −13.7 (−16.3 to −11.1) <.001
4th 123.7 (62.3) −12.6 (−15.1 to −10.0) <.001
5th 112.3 (57.8) −13.8 (−16.5 to −11.1) <.001
6th 98.0 (52.8) −11.7 (−14.5 to −8.9) <.001
7th 93.6 (46.8) −12.1 (−14.4 to −9.9) <.001
8th 85.8 (48.6) −11.4 (−14.6 to −8.2) <.001
9th 83.8 (44.5) −10.2 (−13.2 to −7.2) <.001
10th 80.2 (41.7) −11.3 (−14.6 to −8.1) <.001
Regular treatment by
diagnosis
Depressive disorder 246.2 (116.4) −13.8 (−17.1 to −10.4) <.001
Anxiety disorder 164.8 (75.4) −13.1 (−16.2 to −10.0) <.001
Substance-related
disorder
161.3 (78.4) −10.8 (−13.2 to −8.4) <.001
Personality disorder 153.2 (74.5) −7.4 (−10.2 to −4.6) <.001
Psychotic disorder 148.3 (29.8) −10.6 (−14.5 to −6.7) <.001
Missing 108.1 (69.6) −33.9 (−36.7 to −31.1) <.001
Disorder first diagnosed
in childhood
105.9 (47.6) −10.8 (−13.3 to −8.2) <.001
Miscellaneous disorder 87.7 (41.6) −15.5 (−18.2 to −12.9) <.001
Bipolar disorder 63.4 (59.5) −6.5 (−10.3 to −2.7) <.001
a Ordinary least squares regression of
daily openings of treatment records
divided bymean daily openings in
2011 on year, day-of-the-week, and
day-of-the-year indicator variables.
All samples contain only adults.
b Estimated coefficient on the
indicator for the year 2012.
Coefficients on the indicators for
2010, day of the year, and day of the
week not shown.
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commitmentandby25.1%(95%CI, 20.8%-29.4%;P < .001) for
acute care (Figure 1C and D and Table 2). The difference-
in-differences estimates were similar: 96.7% (95%CI, 54.5%-
138.9%;P < .001) for involuntarycommitmentand29.6%(95%
CI, 20.4%-38.9%; P < .001) for acute care.
HeterogeneitybyNeighborhood IncomeandMajorDiagnosis
Figure 2A shows the overlaid residual plots for each of the 10
incomedeciles.Before the reform, treatment rates in thepoor-
est decile had been 2.7 times higher than those in the richest
decile. The reduction in the demand for treatment was sig-
nificantlygreater inpoorerneighborhoods than inricherneigh-
borhoods (Table 2 and eTable 6 in the Supplement).
Figure 2B shows the overlaid residual plots for the 5 ma-
jor diagnoses with the greatest number of treatment records.
Overall, the demand responsewas statistically significant for
all major diagnosis categories (Table 2 and eTable 7 in the
Supplement). The number of records opened each day for pa-
tients with psychotic disorder decreased by 10.6% (95% CI,
−14.5% to−6.7%;P < .001),whichwasnotmuch smaller than
the estimated effect for patients with depressive disorder
(−13.8%; 95%CI, −17.1% to −10.4%; P < .001) or anxiety disor-
der (−13.1%; 95% CI, −16.2% to −10.0%; P < .001).
Figure 2C shows that the increase in involuntary commit-
ment after the reform was driven primarily by patients diag-
nosed with psychotic disorder and, to a lesser extent, by pa-
tients diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Figure 2D shows that
the increase in acute care after the reform was driven by pa-
tients whose diagnoses were recorded as missing.
Costs vs Savings
Table 3 gives the estimated changes in mental health care
spending after the reform by diagnosis. For adults, the an-
nualnumberof regular treatment recordsdecreasedby58498,
Figure 2. Heterogeneity in Daily Openings of Treatment Records by Sample in Adults, 2010-2012
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which generated total savings of €70.4million (US$79.4mil-
lion).Meanwhile, involuntary commitment increasedby 1064
andacute care increasedby5066,which generated total costs
of €57.0million (US$64.3 million). Consequently, the reform
saved an estimated €13.4million (US$15.1 million)more than
it cost.Net savingswere largest fordepressivedisorder at€15.3
million (US$17.3million) and anxiety disorder at €9.8million
(US$11.1million).However, net savingswerenegative for psy-
chotic disorder at −€19.5 million (−US$22.0 million) and bi-
polar disorder at −€6.0 million (−US$6.8 million).
Discussion
After 8 years of increases, the number ofmental health treat-
ment records opened by adults in the Netherlands decreased
when cost sharing for mental health care increased in 2012.
The size of this decrease was significant for severe and mild
disorders and larger in low-income than inhigh-incomeneigh-
borhoods. Simultaneously, among adults, involuntary com-
mitment almost doubled and acute mental health care in-
creased by 25% between 2011 and 2012. On aggregate, the
reform was associated with estimated net savings in treat-
ment costs of €13.4million (US$15.1million).However, for in-
dividuals with psychotic disorder or bipolar disorder, the ad-
ditional costs for involuntary commitment and acute care
exceeded savings by €25.5million (US$28.8million) because
of fewer patients in regular care.
Our study is the first, to our knowledge, to investigate the
influence of a patient cost-sharing reform for specialist men-
tal health care only and to evaluate the consequences for pa-
tients across an entire country. Our empirical strategy is com-
parable to recent evaluations of cost-sharing reforms in
Massachusetts21,22 and California9 and of the increase in the
deductible of health insuranceplans offeredby a largeUS em-
ployer to its employees.6 Our research design has several ad-
vantages.First, our settingprovidedvariation inmentalhealth
insurance coverage that was plausibly unrelated to other fac-
tors. Second, our estimateswere based on observed behavior
in response to a real-world policy change. Third, our data al-
lowed us to obtain statistically precise estimates for hetero-
geneous effects based on patient characteristics of down-
stream costs as measured by types of treatment.
Our findings contribute to the health care literature and
are relevant for policy makers. Because of the large increase
in involuntary commitment and acute mental health care, it
appears that at least somepatients stopped regular treatment
even though it was of high value. Optimal policy requires de-
signing a system that incentivizes patients to use services for
which the clinical and nonclinical benefits exceed monetary
andnonmonetarycostsandto forgoservices forwhichtheben-
efits do not justify the cost. Our results do not rule out that
higher cost sharing incentivized certain individuals to reduce
low-value care. However, the downstream costs that we ob-
served for patientswith psychotic disorder and bipolar disor-
derareanexampleofhowcost sharingcan increase rather than
decrease total spending for certain populations.
Although the institutional context in theUnitedStatesdif-
fers substantially from that in theNetherlands,where out-of-
pocketmaximums are lower on average, these results can in-
formthecurrentUScost-sharingdebate.TheUnitedStateshas
seenan increase in thenumberof insured individuals after the
implementationof thePatient Protection andAffordableCare
Act, as well as a reduction in the coverage gap betweenmen-
tal health care and other health services since the 1980s23 in
largepartbecauseofparity legislation.24However, averagecost
sharing forhealth serviceshas increasedamong thosewithpri-
vate health insurance.25,26 Furthermore, public policy seems
tobeheaded toward less rather thanmore coverage.Our study
suggests that reducing coverage for mental health care can
lowermental health care costs overall butmay have negative
unintended consequences for the seriously ill.
Limitations
Ourstudyhasseveral limitations.First,other factorscouldhave
influenced the use ofmental health care at the time of the re-
form. However, we found no macroeconomic shocks, demo-
graphic shifts, or policy changes around January 1, 2012, that
couldexplain theabruptandpersistentdecrease inuse in2012.
To control for any remaining factors, we relied on our differ-
ence-in-differencesmodel, which used a sample of youths to
construct counterfactual trends, and the results were consis-
tent with the baseline estimates. Second, we could not link
treatment records for individuals across time to identify the
characteristics of those individuals who discontinued treat-
ment after the reform. Third, we were unable to investigate
Table 3. Change in Net Treatment Costs for Specialist Mental Health Care After Cost-Sharing Reform
Diagnosis Group
Change in Regular Care Costs,
€ (US$)
Change in Acute and Commitment Costs,
€ (US$)
Change in Total Costs,
€ (US$)
Psychotic disorder −12 123 339 (−13 669 705) 31 640 099 (35 675 883) 19 516 760 (22 006 178)
Bipolar disorder −1 424 480 (−1 606 176) 7 414 818 (8 360 599) 5 990 338 (6 754 423)
Personality disorder −3 491 561 (−3 936 919) 3 283 414 (3 702 223) −208 147 (−234 697)
Missing −2 135 140 (−2 407 484) 1 214 963 (1 369 935) −920 177 (−1 037 549)
Disorder first diagnosed in childhood −3 877 689 (−4 372 299) 2 161 148 (2 436 809) −1 716 541 (−1 935 491)
Substance-related disorder −10 366 451 (−11 688 721) 4 943 812 (5 574 409) −5 422 639 (−6 114 311)
Miscellaneous disorder −6 708 884 (−7 564 621) 1 221 542 (1 377 353) −5 487 342 (−6 187 268)
Anxiety disorder −10 959 769 (−12 357 719) 1 113 139 (1 255 123) −9 846 630 (−11 102 596)
Depressive disorder −19 356 555 (−21 825 539) 4 054 172 (4 571 293) −15 302 383 (−17 254 246)
Total −70 443 868 (−79 429 183) 57 047 107 (64 323 627) −13 396 761 (−15 105 556)
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whether, after the reform,patients substitutedawayfromregu-
lar treatment and toward treatment by a primary care physi-
cianor bymedication, althoughevidence fromaggregatedata
on primary care use suggests that patients did not substitute
toward primary care after the reform (eDiscussion in the
Supplement). Fourth, we could not link treatment records to
additional individual outcomes, and thereforewereunable to
assess the downstream costs of the policy on other medical
costs or on other sectors of the economy inwhich the burden
of untreated illnessmay be significant, such as the labormar-
ket and the criminal justice system.27,28
Conclusions
Using data from the Netherlands, we examined the associa-
tion of a national cost-sharing reform with mental health
care use and downstream costs. A higher out-of-pocket
price was associated with reduced use of mental health
care, which generated aggregate savings but also increased
costly use of involuntary commitment and acute care, par-
ticularly among individuals with psychotic disorder or bipo-
lar disorder.
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